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CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. By Oscar
S. Gray. Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
1970. Pp. xx, 1252.1 $12.00.
As even the most occasional reader of newspapers and magazines
must be aware, the environment - whatever that may be2 - is at
the moment tainted with fashionability and controversies. And we
do have problems: poisoned air, poisoned water, poisoned tuna fish,
urban sprawl, scarred landscapes, power failures, dying species fore-
telling our own mortality, and a sea still gong tormented but soon
perhaps no longer dolphin torn.
From all sides come cries for help. Victims of cement dust,3
oil spills, 4 and alleged illegal conspiracies that poison the air with
exhaust fumes5 have turned to lawyers for support. Utilities required
by law to render essential services are challenged by ecologists and
landscape architects;6 highways are aborted by aesthetes;' Walt Dis-
ney's ski resort in the High Sierras is attacked by more pedestrian
types.8
Into these skirmishes the legal profession has rushed forth, all
unprepared, to succor the oppressed. Apparently not content to see
lawyers advance into battle armed only with the resurrected Rivers
and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899,1 Congress has responded
with a flood of environmental legislation.' ° The publishers have
1 Exclusive of the August 1970 pocket supplement.
2 If it has any meaning at all, the word "environment" is, like "being" or "time,"
probably too basic to admit of a satisfactory definition. "Environmental law," on the
other hand, is probably too new a term to be defined; it is a label in search of a content,
a new bottle waiting hopefully to be filled with old wine. The book under consider-
ation certainly makes no attempt at a definition.
3 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
4 See, e.g., County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970).
5 See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation,
1 ENVIRONMENT REP. 1643 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
6 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
7 See, e.g., Citizens Comm. v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425
F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
8 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hickel, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 20010 (N.D. Cal.
1969), rev'd, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub nom. Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 401 U.S. 907 (1971) (No. 939).
933 U.S.C. §§ 407-15 (1964).
10 See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-
35, 4341-47 (Supp. V, 1970); Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of
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armed us with the Environment Reporter1 and the Environmental
Law Reporter." But no one has prepared a battle plan.
Perhaps when the hurly-burly's done, we shall find ourselves liv-
ing in a better world. But before we lawyers can solve all the prob-
lems of the sublunar world, before those halcyon days come when
every kingfisher fits comfortably into his environmental niche, it
might just be necessary to discover exactly what our environmental
problems are and how the "law" - whatever we mean by that -
relates to them. It seems improbable that random litigation and
hasty legislation will necessarily usher in a new Eden, unless some
coherent purpose informs the growing profusion of statutes and
decisions that constitute the body of "environmental law."13  What
we need now, desperately, are texts and casebooks that will aid us
to think rationally about the chaos we have created both in the en-
vironment and in the law.
It would therefore appear to be a cause for rejoicing that Pro-
fessor Gray has compiled, and the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA)
has published, a text entitled Cases and Materials on Environmental
Law.'4  But sadly, there is no reason to rejoice. This book is a
monumental disappointment and a gross disservice to its readers.
Obviously the publisher wished to have on its list the first casebook
on environmental law, and in that it was successful. But unfor-
tunately, the book is not usable.
If this "casebook" is designed primarily as a "teaching tool for
law schools,"'1 it will serve its intended function only if thrown at
a recalcitrant student's head. If it "may serve the practicing at-
torney as an introductory handbook,"'16 that will be one of the mess-
iest introductions since Brer Fox shook hands with Tar Baby. If it
"may also be of interest to conservation and design professionals and
the administrators of affected operating activities,"'17 their interest
will only be frustrated.
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91; Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
11 The Environment Reporter first came out in late 1970.
12 The Environmental Law Reporter first came out early in 1971.
13See note 2 supra.
140. GRAY, CASES AD MAERIALS oN ENR O RNmENTAL. LAW (1970).
15Id. at v.
16Id.
171d. "[A)dministrators of affected operating activities" is typical of Professor
Gray's federal prose style. Would that the Government Printing Office but follow the
example of Her Majesty's Stationary Office and publish an American counterpart to
Sir Ernest Gower's Plain Words.
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This undoubtedly is a harsh indictment. But Cases and Materials
on Environmental Law is not merely another casebook; it is the
first attempt to gather in one text the statutes and decisions that
form the core of environmental law.18 If, as I fear, the mere exis-
tence of this tome will prevent others from preparing teaching
materials and texts to aid us in comprehending - and ultimately in
doing what we can to solve - our environmental problems, then
the publisher who launched this preemptive strike has done us all
a sad disservice.
The blame for this abortive work can be placed only on the edi-
tors at BNA. Professor Gray, seduced perhaps by a Xerox ma-
chine, has at the worst been guilty of preparing a casebook that is
not very good. The onus must rest on the midwife who mutilated
this compilation at its birth. Simply stated, the book is not edited.
The currency of its materials shows the haste with which it was
prepared. Its volume testifies to Professor Gray's labor. But its
erroneous citations, tpyographical errors, and scrambled organiza-
tion show that BNA is bringing to the information business those
techniques of Commodore Vanderbilt which made the Penn Central
what it is today.
This edition is so corrupt that whatever the book's virtues might
have been, one cannot rely upon it for any purpose. Consider the
following bloopers:
"This is a bill in equity ...appealing from a decision on the
board of appeals (board) of the town of Duxbury (town) denying
the plaintiff a special permit to excavate and fill a portion of the
board of appeals (board) ..... 19
In what purports to be the full text opinion of Crowther v.
Seaborg,20 approximately 16 paragraphs are omitted without warn-
IS Other recent entries into this field include: J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK (1970); LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (M. Baldwin &
J. Page eds. 1970); and J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971). None of
these, however, are intended to serve as casebooks.
19 0. GRAY, supra note 14, at 252. The quoted material is taken from a purported
reprint of MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, --- Mass. , 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970).
The mistake is corrected in the August 1970 pocket supplement at S-20. Perhaps out
of shame the supplement does not contain a separate section of errata.
20 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970). Crowther is the kind of case on which one
could base an entire course of environmental law. It contains, among other matters,
one of the best lower court discussions on the questions of standing, justiciability,
sovereign immunity, and scope of review, and facts such as only the Atomic Energy
Commission or a black humorist could invent. It ends with the despairing conclusion
that the amount of risk to be taken with the unknown dangers of nuclear radiation in-
volves a "value judgment" which Congress reserved for "politcally responsive institu-
tions" like the Atomic Energy Commission. ld. at 1232.
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ing, including the key discussion of the propriety under the Atomic
Energy Commission's radiation protection standards of the defen-
dant's plans to flare radioactive gas into the atmosphere.21
The opinion of the district court in Citizens Committee v. Volpe'
is cited to the wrong page of the official reporter, not only where the
text of the opinion is set out in the casebook,2 3 but also in the full
text version of the court of appeals opinion.24
Recurrent errors such as these tend to totally destroy the book's
credibility. The sheer bulk of its material suggests that it is intended
to serve as a compilation of source materials. But what use can be
made of a corrupt edition of even the most complete sources?
Furthermore, the assembled materials, particularly the statutory
materials, include a great deal of solid waste. Consider the follow-
ing nuggets of information: the Secretary of the Interior is author-
ized to contract for medical attention for employees of the National
Park Service;25 the Convention on the Continental Shelf "shall, un-
til 31 October 1958, be open for signature .... ;2  when a plaque
is awarded to an industrial organization or political subdivision un-
der section 22 (f) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,27
"[t~he President of the United States, the Governor of the appro-
priate State, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the
President pro tempore of the Senate shall be notified of the award
... 1,,;2 the report required under paragraph 8 or [sic] Bureau of
the Budget Circular No. A-82, Revised ... will be required for the
period July 1, 1968, to June 30, 1969.29
That the editors have performed so badly does not, however, to-
tally disguise the fact that the conception of the book is also unfortu-
2 1 The gas became radioactive when the Atomic Energy Commission exploded an
atomic bomb at the bottom of a well. The idea was to see if such a technique would
increase the amount of natural gas recoverable from the well. In Crowther, the plain-
tiffs brought suit, without success, to enjoin this experiment. Surely, somewhere there
must be a shaggy dog story ending, "... so, if you ever want some radioactive natural
gas ....
22 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 949 (1970).
230. GRAY, supra note 14, at 930. The erroneous page citation given in the text
is 302 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This error is corrected in the pocket supplement
at S-87.




2733 U.S.C.A. § 1172(f) (3) (Supp. 1970).
28 0. Gray, supra note 14, at 469-70.
29Id. at 1056.
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nate. Its organization is chaotic. The stuff of lawsuits and human
interest, the material which will mean the most to the average law
student or lawyer, is all lumped at the back of the book starting on
page 1079. All that precedes this page is a statutory never-never
land. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to applying legal techniques to
the solution of environmental problems is that the federal govern-
ment is not yet organized in a manner that allows it to deal with these
problems effectively. 30 Unfortunately, Professor Gray has elected to
structure his book on the present organizational pattern of the fed-
eral government.
Chaos is not a description of chaos. Professor Gray's book tends
to obscure, rather than isolate, the various doctrines and problems
that may justify the treatment of environmental law as a separate
area of study.3
For example, Professor Gray has included a section on standing
to sue,32 but none of the cases set out in that section deal with en-
vironmental matters. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC,33 the first case recognizing that associations of environmentalists
can have standing to seek review of administrative decisions without
showing an economic injury, is hidden away under the heading of
"Federal Power Commission." Citizens Committee v. Volpe,34 the
leading case holding that environmental associations have similar
30 The Nixon administration has, to its credit, begun to attack the worst of its struc-
tural problems by creating the Environmental Protection Agency. See Reorganization
Plan No. 3, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2996.
31 In addition to the confused organization of Professor Gray's book, there are some
glaring omissions. For example, both the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (Supp.
V, 1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (b) (Supp. 1970), place the primary re-
sponsibility for pollution control on the states. Yet Professor Gray's book hardly deals
with state antipollution laws.
Moreover, except for a brief reference to the ninth amendment and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (0. GRAY, supra note 14, at 1198-99), there is no
mention made of the possible constitutional limitations on the government's power to
degrade the environment. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp.,
1 ENVIRONMENT REP. 1640 (D. Mont. 1970), where in dicta the court recognized "that
each of us is constitutionally protected in our natural and personal state of life and
health." Id. at 1641.
32 0. GRAY, supra note 14, at 347. In addition to citations to four law review arti-
cles, this section merely contains the following three opinions: Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968); Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
33 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cit. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). The citation
in the text, incidentally, is to 348 U.S. 941 (1966). 0. GRAY, supra note 14, at 857.
34 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aft'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 949 (1970).
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standing under the Administrative Procedure Act,85 is lumped
under "Department of Transportation."
Although there is a section on the "public trust" doctrine,36 it
contains only a limited number of cases, which never mention the
doctrine itself, and a brief summary of Professor Sax's article87 that
popularized the doctrine. The one case on which all public trust
arguments must ultimately rely, Illinois Central Railway Co., v. Illi-
nois,18 is printed over 900 pages away with no cross-references to the
doctrine which it fostered.
The problem of energy resource allocation underlies almost all
environmental problems, pollution being almost invariably a func-
tion of energy consumption or production; but it would be mon-
strously hard for a student to recognize that this problem brings a
basic unity to the materials which have been randomly inserted into
Professor Gray's book. Naturally, there is a section on pollution con-
trol in the book,3" but it centers primarily on legislation that is either
outdated40 or ineffective.41 The most important federal antipollu-
tion statute (whatever its drafters' intent might have been), the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899,4 is catalogued un-
35 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970).
s60. GRAY, supra note 14, at 1160-69. The public trust doctrine assumes that
certain property (wetlands or public parks) is owned by the government subject to a
"trust" for the benefit of the public. The trust somehow limits the owner's power to
dispose of or otherwise deal with the property. It should be apparent, but it certainly
is not in Professor Gray's book, that any attempt to analyze such a doctrine, particularly
in terms of the law of trusts, requires the mental gymnastics of a Zen Buddhist.
87 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 MICa. L. REV. 471 (1970).
38 146 U.S. 387 (1892), reprinted in 0. GRAY, supra note 14, at 224.
30 0. GRAY, supra note 14, at 387.
40 The Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-57L (Supp. V, 1970), amending
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-71 (1964), reprinted in 0. GRAY, supra note 14,
at 392-417, was completely revised by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, which were too recent to be included in either the text or the
pocket supplement.
This is not the only instance where Professor Gray's attempt to catch the Zeitgeist
on the wing has led him to emphasize ephemeral matters. The most striking examples
of this are his reprinting of and reliance on the full district court opinions in Sierra
Club v. Hickel, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 20010 (N.D. Cal. 1969), rev'd, 433 F.2d
24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub wom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 401 U.S. 907 (1971)
(No. 939), and Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd, 430 F.2d
199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910. See 0. GRAY, supra note 14, at 35,
137. Both decisions were reversed on appeal, and although the appellate court opinions
are extremely important, the district court opinions now appear to be doomed to obliv-
ion.
41The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 466-66g, 1151-60,
1171-75 (Supp. 1970), reprinted in 0. GRAY, supra note 14, at 435-71.
42 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-15 (1964).
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der the Corps of Engineers; and the few "nuisance" cases dealing
with pollution that Professor Gray reprints are buried at the back
of the book.
And so it goes. Hopefully, into oblivion.
Of course, today's environmental concern may be largely a fad -
what did ever happen to poverty law? - and son perhaps we should
not regret this book too much. Maybe it will only serve as a tomb-
stone for a great deal of irritating rhetoric. If it has not delayed
the appearance of more serious works, no great harm has been done.
Still one wants to bring it to the attention of those other faddists,
the protectors of the consumer. Twelve dollars is a lot of money
for a lead balloon, and it might hurt if it were dropped on one's foot.
PETER D. JUNGER*
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT. By John H. Jackson.
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1969. Pp. xxxv,
948. $27.50.
"Anyone who reads GATT is likely to have his sanity impaired."
Thus does Professor Jackson introduce his 948 page work on the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), quoting Senator
Millikin at the 1951 Hearings held by the Senate Finance Commit-
tee.' If Senator Millikin is right, Professor Jackson has successfully
played the role of psychiatrist, for his book goes a long way toward
the restoration of rationality.
As those familiar with this agreement are aware, GATT is the
ill-prepared understudy which was required to step before the inter-
national economic footlights when one of the scheduled stars, the
International Trade Organization (ITO), expired before curtaintime.
The ITO was originally designed as an international institution
whose function would be to assure the orderly expansion of inter-
national trade. It was to take its place alongside two other inter-
national institituions, and the three together were to form a sort of
"three sister" act for world economic affairs. The second sister was
designed to deal with world monetary problems and became the
International Monetary Fund. The third was intended to cope with
capital development and was given the rather unwieldy title of In-
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
